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KATRINA M. ALBRIGHT*

The Extension of Legal Rights to
Animals under a Caring Ethic: An
Ecofeminist Exploration of Steven
Wise's Rattling the Cage
ABSTRACT
In his book, Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for
Animals, Steven M. Wise argues that nonhuman animals should
be counted as persons under the law, therefore grantingthem legal
standing in the American court system. Wise advocates the
immediate extension of legal rights to chimpanzees and bonobos
(pygmy chimpanzees), on the basis that these animals possess
mental capacities that would allow them to pass currentstandard
tests for personhood. Wise's theory presents a framework for
extending legalprotectionsto animalsbasedon the values currently
embraced by the American legal system. However, this approach
extends legal rights to select species of animals that are deemed to
possess rationality.Ecofeminist reformofthe American legal system
would build upon Wise's theory and expand legal protectionsfor
many more species of animals.
Ecofeminism draws connections between the domination
over women and the domination over nature and nonhuman
animals. It identifies Western patriarchal value systems as the
common source of culturalvalidationof environmental destruction
and violence against women and animals. Ecofeminist animal
welfare theorists criticize the classic concept of animal "rights,"
which places importanceon the idea that rationalityand sentience
of animals is similar to human reason.Animal "rights" theory, as
it is used both in Wise's book and in the animal welfare movement
in general, thereforewithholds protectionsfrom those animals who
fail a "rationality"test. Moving awayfrom animal rightsdialogue,
then, ecofeminists instead embrace a "feminist caring ethic." A
caring ethic recognizes animals' inherent right to bodily security
and integrity based not on their rationality,but instead on their
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of the University of New Mexico School of Law.
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emotional lives and relationships with humans, as well as on
humans' ethical responsibilitiesto end animal suffering.
Recognition of ecofeminist values in the American legal
system would reject the rationalitystandardcurrently required in
personhood status and in Wise's theory, and would extend legal
rights to animals based on emotional relationships and moral
responsibilities.
I. INTRODUCTION
The animal advocacy movement, in its modem conception, has
existed for fewer than 30 years.' However, the movement has already
splintered into numerous subgroups, each based on distinct theoretical
bases and each working to achieve different, though often complementary,
goals. Classic animal rights theory is based on the provocative writings of
authors who started the movement, such as Peter Singer2 and Tom Regan,3
beginning in the mid-1970s. In more recent years, scholars have developed
new theories, new arguments, and new activist strategies in defense of
nonhuman animals. This article examines and contrasts two such modem
arguments: (1) author Steven M. Wise's argument for granting legal
personhood and courtroom standing to animals, and (2) the ecofeminist
argument for invoking reform of the ways nonhuman animals are valued
in American society.
In his book, Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rightsfor Animals, Wise
argues that nonhuman animals should be counted as persons under the
law, therefore granting them legal standing in the American court system.4
Wise advocates the immediate extension of legal rights to chimpanzees and
bonobos (pygmy chimpanzees) on the basis that these animals possess

1.

GARY L. FRANcLONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS

MOVEMENT 1 (1996).

2.

See, e.g., PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION: A NEW ETHics FOR OUR TREATMENT OF

ANIMALS (1975).
3. See, e.g., TOM REGAN, THECASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (1983). Although Regan appeared
on the scene a bit later than Singer, his theories are still considered to be classic animal rights

theories.
4,

STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS 7 (2000).

Currently, nonhuman animals do not have independent standing in court. A human
challenging the unlawful mistreatment of animals only has standing if the plaintiff her/himself
has suffered harm, in addition to the animals suffering harm. Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc.
v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426,432 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, NationalAss'n for Biomedical Research

v. Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc., 526 U.S. 1064 (1999). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Standingfor
Animals, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1342-58 (2000).
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mental capacities that would allow them to pass current standard tests for
personhood 5
Wise's theory presents a framework for extending legal protections
to animals based on the values currently embraced by the American legal
system. However, this approach extends legal rights to a select species of
animals that are deemed to possess rationality. Alternatively, ecofeminist
reform of the American legal system would build upon Wise's theory and
expand legal protections to many more species.
Ecofeminism is a theory that draws connections between the
domination over women and the domination over nature and nonhuman
animals. It identifies patriarchal value systems as the common source of
both the cultural validation of environmental destruction and violence
against women and animals. Ecofeminist animal welfare theorists criticize
the classic concept of animal "rights," which places importance on the idea
that rationality and sentience of animals is similar to human reason. Animal
"rights" theory, as it is used both in Wise's book and in the animal welfare
movement in general, therefore withholds protections from those animals
who fail a "rationality" test. Moving away from animal rights dialogue,
then, ecofeminists instead embrace the theory of a feminist "caring ethic,"
first introduced by Carol Gilligan in her landmark book, In a Different Voice:
Psychological Theory and Women's Development.6 As utilized by some
ecofeminist scholars, an ethic of care recognizes animals' inherent right to
bodily security and integrity based not on their rationality, but instead on
their emotional lives and relationships with humans, as well as on humans'
ethical responsibilities to end animal suffering.
Recognition of ecofeminist values in the American legal system,
then, would reject the rationality standard currently required in personhood
status and in Wise's theory, and would extend legal rights to animals based
on emotional relationships and moral responsibilities. To support this
thesis, this article first gives a brief overview of the history and philosophies
of the animal protection movement. Wise's legal rights theory is discussed
in this section. Next, the article describes the basic tenets of ecofeninist
theory and of feminist animal welfare theory in particular. Finally, the
article applies ecofeminist theory to Wise's theory and argues that legal
rights for animals should be based on a feminist ethic of caring, rather than
on a standard of rationality.

5. WIsE, supra note 4, at 4-6. Published just two years ago, Wise's book stands as the
foremost theory for legal rights for animals.
6. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT 62-63 (2000).
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I. THEORETICAL BASES FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS
A. The Issue of Terminology
Generally, the term "animal rights" is used to describe any interest
in improving the lives of nonhuman animals. The term is perhaps too
loosely used by the public, however, as different theorists attach different
meanings to the terms "rights" and "animal rights movement." This section
explores some of these meanings and defines these terms as they are used
in this article.
1. The Definition of "Rights"
An important distinction lies in the difference between the common
definition of "rights" and a lawyer's definition of "rights." As the word is
used most often by the public, "rights" involve "moral notions that grow
out of respect for the individual.. .[and rights] establish areas where the
individual is entitled to be protected against the state and the majority .......
In contrast, practitioners of the law attach more technical definitions to
various legal "rights." Wise, himself an attorney, uses these definitions in
his book. In particular, he adopts the classification of legal rights developed
by Yale Law School Professor Wesley Hohfeld. Hohfeld's classification of
legal rights has been followed by most legal scholars and judges for much
of the last century.8
Hohfeld's classification of legal rights is based on the premise that
legal relationships can exist only between two persons. One of the two
persons has a right, or legal advantage, over the other person, who has a
corresponding legal disadvantage. There are four types of legal rights, each
with corresponding legal disadvantages: liberty and no-right, claim and
duty, immunity and disability, and power and liability.' Each is briefly
described below.
•
The first type of right, liberty, includes both negative liberty and
positive liberty. Negative liberty is the freedom from
imprisonment, slavery, and abuse-that is, it provides the right to
bodily freedom and bodily integrity." For animals, freedom from

7. Bernard E. Rollin, The Legal and Moral Bases of Animal Rights, in ETHICS AND ANIMALS
106 (Harlan B. Miller & William H. Williams eds., 1983). Clearly, though, even this common
definition of "rights" includes a legal aspect; protections against the state can only be enforced
by a legal system. Such overlap of morality and the law in the meaning of "rights" is further
discussed in a later section of this article.
S. WISE, supra note 4, at 53.

9.

WESLEY NEwCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN

JUDICIAL REASONING 64 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919), cited in WISE, supranote 4, at 54 n.20.

10. WISE, supra note 4, at 55.
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physical abuse could be one example of a negative liberty right.
Positive liberty is the freedom to act on one's free will.1 For
animals, this could mean the freedom of physical movement and
interaction with other individuals. The corresponding legal
disadvantage to liberty is the "no-right." 2
The second right, a claim, entitles a person to limit the liberty of
another; the other person has a corresponding duty to behave in
certain ways toward the claimant. 3 Hohfeld believed that the only
true legal "rights" are claims with corresponding duties." There are
two types of claims. The first is an in personam claim, which exists
against a select few individuals who have duties. Wise maintains
that this type of claim will likely never be available to nonhuman
animals." The second type of claim is an in rem claim, which exists
against everyone. In rem claims are recognized and protected in the
U.S. Constitution, the common law, and statutory law. 6 Wise gives
us an example: an individual has an in rem claim against being
kidnapped and forced into biomedical research. Every person then
has the correlative duty not to commit such an atrocity. 7
The third right is immunity. This type of right disables one person
from interfering with the liberty of another. Wise distinguishes
immunities from claims: "Claims tell us what we should not do.
Immunities tell us what we cannot do.""8 A holder of an immunity
has no inherent power to sue to stop a violation of that immunity,
but such power may be specifically granted by a judge. 9
The final right is power. This is the ability granted to an individual
by the law to affect her or his own rights or the rights of someone
else. The right of power is one of the most fundamental rights in

0

11. Id. at 56,
12. To illustrate this concept, Wise cites the following example:
The fact that a man has a liberty to look at his neighbour over the garden
fence does not entail that the neighbour has a correlative obligation to let
himself be looked at or not to interfere with the exercise of this specific
liberty-right. So he could, for example, erect a screen on his side of the fence
to block the view.
H.L.A. Hart, Bentham on Legal Rights, in OXFORD ESSAYS INJURISPRUDENCE 171,176 (2d series,
A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973). See also WISE, supra note 4, at 55 n.24.
13. WISE, supra note 4, at 56.
14.

WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN

JUDICIAL REASONING 38,71 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919). See alsoThomas G. Kelch, The Role

of the Rational andthe Emotive in a Theory of Animal Rights, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1,7 (1999).
15. WISE, supra note 4, at 56.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 57.
18. Id. at 58.
19.

REX MARTIN, A SYSTEM OF RIGHTS 31 (1993). See also WISE, supra note 4, at 59 n.52.
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the American legal system; the U.S. Supreme Court called it "the
right conservative of all other rights." 20 The ability to sue for
violations of human rights, for example, arises out of the right of
power.
As illustrated above, defining a "right" is a complex and
problematic endeavor. Some scholars even contend that the concept of
rights has become so ambiguous that it cannot effectively be used in legal
debate.2 Despite the term's ambiguity, however, it continues to be a
common word in both layperson and legal discourse; further, its use is
necessary in a discussion of extending legal rights to animals. Because this
article primarily serves as an exploration of Wise's theory, it generally uses
the term "rights" as Wise defines them in Rattling the Cage, as described
above.
When referring to the social movement that is commonly called the
"animal rights" movement, this article uses phrases such as "animal defense
movement" and "animal advocacy." As discussed in the section below,
even the meaning of the term "animal rights movement" is debated among
scholars and activists.
2. The Definition of "Animal Rights Movement"
Another important term to define is "animal rights movement."
Here again, most actions involving animal welfare are commonly
considered to be part of the animal rights movement. Some scholars,
however, draw distinctions between animal welfare advocates and animal
rights activists. Author Gary L. Francione illustrates the distinction:
[Ujntil the late 1970s, concern about animals had been limited
to assuring that they were treated "humanely" and that they
were not subjected to "unnecessary" suffering. This position,
known as the animal welfare view, assumes the legitimacy of
treating animals instrumentally as means to human ends as
The [animal]
long as certain "safeguards" are employed ....
rights view reflects a shift from a vague obligation to act
"humanely" to a theory of justice that rejects the status of
animals as property and the corresponding hegemony of
humans over nonhumans ....Animal rights theory rejects the
regulation of atrocities and calls unambiguously and
unequivocally for their abolition.'

20. Chambers v. Baltimore &Ohio Railroad, 207 U.S. 142,148 (1907), quoted in WISE, supra
note 4, at 59.
21. MARY MIDGLEY, ANIMALS AND WHY THEY MATTER 61-64 (1984).
22. FRANCIONE, supranote 1, at 1-2. It is important to note, however, that many individuals
whom Francione would label "animal welfare advocates" do consider themselves to be a part
of the animal rights movement. Individuals who, for example, fight for more humane
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Ecofeminists, whose position is more thoroughly discussed in a
later section of this article,2 give yet another definition to the term "animal
rights movement." The notion of "animal rights," as used in some literature,
is based on the idea that some animals possess rationality similar to that of
humans.' Ecofeminists reject the idea that rationality is the appropriate
basis for extending protections to nonhuman animals. Instead, they
advocate protections based on our emotional relationships with animals
and our moral responsibilities to care for animals.'
This article substitutes words such as "defense," "welfare," and
"advocacy" for "rights" to describe what is most often termed the "animal
rights movement." "Welfare" as it is used in this article is not based on
Francione's distinction between the welfare and rights view, but is used
simply under its meaning in layperson's language.
B. Wise's Legal Theory in Rattlingthe Cage
To give a historical context for his legal theory, Wise carefully traces
the foundations of animals' legal "thinghood"26 in Western legal systems,
from Aristotle's time through today. Wise begins this endeavor with
discussion of Aristotle's "Great Chain of Being." The Chain of Being was the
original philosophy envisioning a hierarchical order of Earth's creatures,
with the most rational beings at the top. Animals, who were lower on the
chain, were designed to serve humans.27 This philosophy would come to

conditions in laboratories and factory farm operations consider themselves animal rights
activists, but they would be considered "welfare advocates" by Francione. Francione criticizes
this type of work as failing to further the true goals of the animal rights position, because it
seeks to regulate, rather than abolish, forms of animal exploitation. Some activists counter with
the argument that short-term improvement of exploitative conditions helps reduce animal
suffering in the meantime while activists work toward bigger, long-term goals. See id. at 34-36.
23. See infra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
24. See generally WISE, supra note 4.
25. See, e.g., BEYOND ANIMAL RIGHS: A FEMINIST CARING ETHic FOR THE TREATMENT OF
ANIMALS (Carol J.Adams &Josephine Donovan eds., 1996). To reflect this position and "move
away from the notion of 'rights' toward a more feminist notion of liberation," the organization
Feminists for Animal Rights (FAR) has decided to change its name. Lauren Smedley, Further
than FAR: In Search of a New Name, 12 EcOFEMINISTJ., Nos. 1-2, at 13 (2000). Although FAR has
not yet changed its name, it is considering the following alternatives: Feminists for Animal
Liberation, Feminist/Animal Alliance, Feminist Advocates for Animals, and Feminists for an
Ethical Relation to Animal Life (FERAL). Id.
26. Wise uses the term "thinghood" to describe animals' status under the law, as opposed
to "personhood." See, e.g., WISE, supra note 4, at 23 (titling his chapter, "The Legal Thinghood
of Nonhuman Animals").
27. WISE, supra note 4, at 11. Under this philosophy, humans enjoyed a ranking above all
other earthly creatures and below only God and divine beings. Id.
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influence virtually all later Western perceptions of the universe.'
Fundamental aspects of the Great Chain of Being were adopted by the
Stoics, whose philosophies were then incorporated into Greek and Roman
thought.29 Roman law, of course, formed the foundation of the common law
system, first in England and finally in America; therefore, ancient concepts
of a hierarchy of existence remained imbedded in each subsequent system
of law?3 By describing this evolution of the law, Wise meticulously
establishes the historical origins of our legal system's devaluation of
animals.
Next, Wise moves to a discussion of the behavior of chimpanzees
and bonobos. "Minds are critical for legal rights,"3 Wise maintains, and
therefore he sets out to establish that chimps and bonobos engage in
complex thought processes, possess the capacity to reason, and experience
meaningful emotional relationships. These animals have logical and
mathematical abilities, he explains; they form mental representations of
facts and objects, use tools, communicate in sign language, knowingly tell
lies, display empathy toward others, imitate observed behavior, and teach
learned behavior. 32 Wise proves all this, and yet he still cautions the reader
that he has "mentioned just a small faction" of the recorded evidence
"detailing the astonishing cognitive capacities of chimpanzees and
bonobos." 3
Having established the complex mental and emotional lives of
chimps and bonobos, Wise reaches the heart of his argument. "Few would
argue that the complex autonomies of chimpanzees and bonobos would not
entitle them to bodily liberty and bodily integrity if they were human," he
writes.' Therefore, there exists no reasoned argument for failing to grant

28. Id.
29. Id. at 14.
30. Id.at 31.
31. Id. at 179.
32. Id. at 170-237.
33. WISE, supra note 4, at 230. The stories Wise tells truly are "astonishing." Some of his
most amazing stories are accounts of chimpanzees teaching sign language to one another.
Individual chimpanzees have learned to communicate regularly with other chimps through
sign language, without ever seeing a human use sign language. Id. at 3.
34. Id. at 253. Interestingly, Wise qualifies this statement at several points in his book by
writing that the chimpanzees who exhibit the most complex mental capacities are those who
have been "human-enculturated." In a review of Wise's book, one legal scholar observes,
[L]iving in the company of humans enables chimpanzees and bonobos to
develop abilities that they do not manifest when living only with their own
species. Because Wise thinks that the realization of these capacities is good
for the creature itself, we find ourselves wondering whether he would
support the 'adoption' of primates by humans.
Martha C. Nussbaum, Animal Rights: The Need for a Theoretical Basis, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1506,
1533-34 (2001).
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these animals these basic legal "dignity-rights," or rights to bodily
integrity.' He concludes his book by stating that nothing in his theory
implies that animals should be entitled only to the rights of bodily dignity
and bodily integrity. However, the evidence currently available to us most
clearly establishes chimps' and bonobos' entitlements to these rights in
particular.36 Wise also suggests that other species may be entitled to legal
rights, so long as a certain, definable presence of mind is shown: "Judges
must determine the entitlement to dignity-rights of any nonhuman animal
the same ways they determine the entitlements of chimpanzees, bonobos,
and human beings-according to autonomy. Autonomy, of course, arises
from [having] minds."37
It is important to note that Wise's theory is progressive-some
consider it radical. Like many of those who advocate legal reform, Wise and
others who support legal rights for animals face fierce opposition. A
common concern is that some humans do not wish to be restricted in their
ability to kill and/or harm animals for education, entertainment, research,
or food purposes.' One author writes, "Society has placed a greater value
on human life than on animal life and those with extreme beliefs in animal
rights have ignored this .... Animal rights would not be co-existent with
human rights[;j they would be in competition with each other." It is true
that most rights afforded to a group, human or otherwise, will be in conflict
with other existing rights. In our legal system, most rights must be asserted
against other rights.40 In addition to this concern, other complex questions
arise once the premise is established that animals deserve some basic legal
rights. Which rights in particular will we grant to animals? Against whom
will these rights exist? What will be the boundaries of those rights?4" Some

35. WISE, supra note 4, at 267.
36. Id. The author recognizes that a significant and compelling discussion of the extent to
which animals should be granted rights remains outside the scope of this article.
37. Id. at 268.
38. See, e.g., F. BARBARA ORLANS ET AL., THE HUMAN USE OF ANIMALS: CASE STUDIES IN

ETHICAL CHOICE 19-20 (1993) (discussing "speciesism" as the belief that human interests in
using animals as resources outweigh animals' interests in freedom from harm).
39. Harold W. Hannah, Animals as Property: Changing Concepts, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 571,576
(2001) (discussing David R. Schmahmann & Lori J. Polacheck, The Case Against Rights for
Animals, 22 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 747,752-61 (1995)).

40. In Wise's previously cited example, one property owner asserts her/his right to
privacy against the neighbor's liberty right to peer over the fence. See supranote 12; WISE, supra
note 4, at 55.
41. Questions similar to these are presented by Schmahmann & Polacheck, supra note 39,
at 754-55. The authors also ask additional questions, including, "When and how will such
rights be invoked?" and "Who will enforce such rights?" Id.
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opponents of animal42welfare believe these questions are so problematic they
remain unsolvable.
Even some scholars who share Wise's convictions about animal

welfare criticize his theory. For example, some maintain that the
achievement of independent jural standing for animals is highly unlikely
due to the political and legal climate in this country. These critics contend
that arguing for jural standing for animals is a waste of time, and that
activist resources should be spent instead on strengthening statutory law
and the judicial decisions that interpret existing law.43 Wise himself realizes
that the extension of courtroom standing to animals necessarily must
coincide with further social reform, and at one point he refers to his theory
as an "experiment."' Yet radical legal reform is best accomplished when it
begins in theory that is well-reasoned and with solid foundations. This is
what Wise provides in Rattling the Cage. As this article argues later,
however, Wise's theory, though well-founded, still can be expanded and
strengthened by the application of ecofeminist theory.
III. THEORETICAL BASES FOR ECOFEMINISM
According to basic tenets of ecofeminism, environmentalism is a
feminist issue. The theory of ecoferninism draws connections between the
domination over women and the domination over nature, and it identifies
patriarchal values and hierarchical thinking as the conceptual frameworks
that enable and propagate such domination. An important aspect of
ecofeminism is the recognition of dualism in Western thought. "A value
dualism is a pair of contrasting concepts in which one is seen as dominant
42. See, e.g., Schmahmann & Polacheck, supra note 39. Although definitive answers to
these important questions lie outside the scope of this article, it is clear that reasonable and just
solutions to these problems must exist. Legislators and courts have worked through these
issues when granting new legal rights to groups of humans; thus, history shows that our legal
system and its practitioners have all the necessary tools to address these questions. Further, the
fact that these questions may present a challenge to lawmakers does not invalidate humans'
moral responsibilities to afford basic protections to living creatures.
43. See, e.g., Nussbaum, supra note 34; Lieutenant Commander R.A. Conrad, Rattling the
Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals, 166 MIL L. REv. 226,227-30 (2000) (book review). One
author notes, "If it is generally agreed that animals, because of their capacity for feeling, should
be treated humanely, there is no reason why the denial of standing to animals should result
in their oppression... .Just because animals are not endowed with the same rights as humans
does not mean that they can be maltreated and exploited with impunity... .[Ojur legal system
is adapting to society's evolving recognition of the importance of animal welfare. There is no
reason not to develop and legally enforce this refinement of our collective animal
consciousness [through statutory reform]." Fiona M. St. John-Parsons, "FourLegs Good, Two
Legs Bad": The Issue of Standing in Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman and Its
Implicationsfor the Animal Rights Movement, 65 BROOK. L. REv. 895,932 (1999).
44. St. John-Parsons, supranote 43, at 118.
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over the other, and they are viewed as exclusive arid oppositional. This
pattern, that one is subordinate and instrumental to the other, can be seen
in the exploitation of women and nature inWestern patriarchal societies. "'45
Such dualisms include women/men, humans/nonhuman animals, and
culture/nature. By establishing these dualisms, patriarchal societies
perpetuate power imbalances, which are sustained through the domination
and submission of women, minorities, nature, and animals. One theorist
terms mainstream culture as "dominionist. "46 He' writes, "[the]
patriarchy.. .is our dominionist culture's system for the control of hierarchal
relations between men and women. It maintains order in those relations just
as dominionism
maintains relations between human beings and the rest of
47
nature."
Ecofeminism also notes ways in which patriarchal cultures draw
comparisons between women and nature. Once women and nature are
equated, they may be similarly dominated.*
Woven everywhere into the tapestry of European art and
literature and seemingly an inseparable part of most
philosophical and scientific texts-even embedded in the
structure of European languages-is the assumption that
women are closer to nature than men are. The notion is not
intended as a compliment. In the hierarchical geography of
European tradition, not only are human beings elevated
above the rest of nature, but men are closer to heaven than

45. Dana Roach, Ecofeminism and the Artic National Wildlife Refuge (unpublished
Environmental Ethics Certificate Program thesis, University of Georgia), available at
http://www.phil.uga.edu/eecp/roachab.htm (last visited Mar. 28,2001).
46. JIM MASON, AN UNNATURAL ORDER: UNCOVERING THE ROOTS OF OUR DOMINATION OF
NATURE AND EACH OTHER (1993).
47. Id. at 266.
48. It is important to note, however, that many feminists embrace a relationship with
animals that is unique to women and draw comparisons between women and animals.
Women and animals have existed together in the interior world of the soul.
It is no coincidence that the word anima bespeaks the human soul in its
feminine form....[Wjomen have [transformed cultural attitudes about
animals] because our approach to relationship has been different from that
of men. What women have brought into the equation is a respect for feeling
and empathy as tools to create intimate bonds of connection. Perhaps it is our
own bodies that remind us that we, too, are animal.. .It has been women,
primarily, who have spoken out most often against the suffering and pain of
animals, and it has mostly been women who have had the courage to admit
their love for the other lives around us.
LINDA HOGAN ET AL., INTIMATE NATURE: THE BOND BETWEEN WOMEN AND ANIMALS xi-xiii
(1998).
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women. In short, the idea that women are close to nature is an;
argument for the dominion of men.49
It is clear, then, that environmentalism is a feminist issue. Why is
animal advocacy also a feminist issue? The organization Feminists for
Animal Rights (FAR)s' utilizes ecofeminist theory to explain the connection,
stating that "exploitation of women and animals derives from the same
patriarchal mentality .... [P]atriarchy [is] a system of hierarchical
domination, a system which works for the powerful and willing against the
powerless and unwilling .... [T]he common denominator in the lives of
women and animals is violence-either real or threatened.... " FAR also
draws connections between the position of women and nonhuman animals
by stating that "[iun patriarchal society women and animals are
considered.. .inferior, 'cute,' childish, uncontrollable, emotional, impulsive,
instinctive, irrational, evil, property, objects.. [and] in patriarchal society
women and animals are referred to as.. .chicks, bitches, pussies, foxes, dogs,
cows, beavers, kittens, sows, shrews, heifers, vixens.... "" Clearly, then, the
issues of animal welfare and women's rights share commonalities. It simply
took the activism of a few forward-thinking ecofeminists to expose these
commonalities and begin to unite the feminist and animal advocacy
movements.5 3

49. SUSAN GRIFFIN, WOMAN AND NATURE: THE ROARING INSIDE HER ix (1978). Griffin goes
further to argue that the association of women with nature serves the desire of Western culture
to perceive of humans as being separate and distinct from nature:
The association between women and nature has not only served to oppress
women, it has also acted as a device for denial, a means to evade the simple
truth that human existence is immersed in nature, dependent on nature,
inseparable from it. By imagining women as closer to nature, it becomes
possible to imagine men as farther away from nature. And in this way, both
men and women can indulge in the fantasy that the human condition can be
free of mortality, as well as the exigencies and needs of natural limitation.
Id. at x-xi.
50. Although FAR members are the leading proponents of the move away from
patriarchal "rights" debate, at this point FAR maintains the use of the word "rights" in its
name. For further discussion, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
51. Feminists for Animal Rights, at http://www.farinc.org/maininfo.html (last visited
Oct. 28, 2002).
52. Id.
53. Ecofeminists expose the commonalities between these and still other social issues:
[ecofeminist] theory explores a range of concerns using a range of theoretical
approaches. Issues of representations of women, reproductive rights, sexual
violence, racial violence and white supremacy, environmental exploitation,
the relationship between knowledge, power and value, [and] the imaging of
God, are issues that intersect with the defense of animals.
CAROL J.ADAMS, NEITHER MAN NOR BEAST: FEMINISM AND THE DEFENSE OF ANIMALS 16 (1994).
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A. The Ecofeminist Vision of Animal Advocacy
1. General PrinciplesConnecting Ecofeminism and Animal Welfare Theory
Carol Adams, FAR board member and author of the
groundbreaking book The Sexual Politics of Meat," was perhaps the first
scholar to publicly draw connections between feminism, ecofeminism, and
the animal advocacy movement. Expanding upon fundamental principles
of ecofeminism, Adams creates a "feminist-vegetarian critical theory" based
on "the perception that women and animals are similarly positioned in a
patriarchal world, as objects rather than subjects."'5 After establishing this
connection, Adams calls for the adoption of "ethical vegetarianism"-that
is, "vegetarianism arising from an ethical decision that regards meat eating
as an unjustifiable exploitation of the other animals."' By adopting ethical
vegetarianism, feminists are "rebuking a meat eating and patriarchal
world."57 In her later works, Adams applies these ecofeminist principles to
other animal and feminist issues in addition to vegetarianism.5
Adams and other ecofeminists argue that since current patriarchal
values are rooted in history, it is important to look to the past to understand
commonalities in the situations of women and nonhuman animals. Animal
rights philosopher Peter Singer, writing during the initial development and
documentation of ecofeminist theory, made such a connection when he
argued that "supporters of liberation for Blacks and Women should support
Animal Liberation too." Consider the following passage:
When Mary Wolistonecraft, a forerunner of today's feminists,
published her Vindication of the Rights of Women in 1792, her
views were widely regarded as absurd, and before long an
anonymous publication appeared entitled A Vindicationof the
Rights of Brutes. The author of this satirical work (now known
to have been Thomas Taylor, a distinguished Cambridge
philosopher) tried to refute Mary Wollstonecraft's arguments
by showing that they could be carried one stage further. If the
argument for equality was sound when applied to women,
why should it not be applied to dogs, cats, and horses? The
reasoning seemed to hold for these "brutes" too; yet to hold

54. CAROL J. ADAMS, THE SEXUAL POLmCS OF MEAT: A FEMINIST-VEGETARIAN CRITICAL
THEORY (10th anniversary ed. 2000).

55. Id. at 180.
56. Id. at 27-28.
57. Id. at 28.
58. See, e.g., ADAMS & DONOVAN, supra note 25; ADAMS, supra note 53; CAROL J. ADAMS,
ECOFEMINISM AND THE SACRED (1993).
59. SINGER, supra note 2, at 1.
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that brutes had rights was manifestly absurd; therefore the
reasoning by which this conclusion had been reached must be
unsound, and if unsound when applied to brutes, it must also
be unsound when applied to women, since the very same
arguments had been made in each case.'
The shared historical oppression of both women and animals, then,
is a central principle in ecofeminist theory. Another central principle in
Adams's writings is the concept of the "absent referent." Under a feminist
vegetarian analysis, the absent referent is the identity of an animal who has
been killed for human consumption.61
[W]hat I call the structure of the absent referent [is that]
[blehind every meal of meat is an absence: the death of the
animal whose place the meat takes. The "absent referent" is
that which separates the meat eater from the animal and the
animal from the end product. The function of the absent
referent is to keep our "meat" separated from any idea that
she or he was once an animal, to keep something from being
seen as having been someone.6
The identity of a slaughtered animal is not always the absent
referent. The absent referent may be the humanity of a woman objectified
in pornography; or it may be the violence inflicted on a woman when one
refers, for example, to environmental destruction as the "rape" of the
earth.63 Ultimately, the absent referent is any characteristic that is removed
from an image or an identity, therefore making it psychologically easier for
consumers to subjugate women and animals.
Once connections have been made between feminism, environmentalism, and animal welfare, the next step is to work for change in
societal, social, and legal realms. The next subsection of this article explores
the adoption of a caring ethic as one method of implementing change.
2. Different Voices Theory and the "Ethic of Care"
In addition to exploring the connections between the subjugation
of women, nature, and nonhuman animals, Adams advocates widespread
social reform: "The goal of feminist defenses of animals is that humanity
will shed its Euro-American malestream orientation, will shed its urge to

60. Id. Interestingly, in the 1800s, Percy Shelley authored an essay promoting
vegetarianism and patterned his title after Wollstonecraft's book. Percy Shelley, A Vindication
of NaturalDiet, in IV THE COMPLETE WORKS OF PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY (Roger Ingpen & Walter
E. Peck eds., 1965), cited in ADAMS, supra note 54, at 96.
61. ADAMS, supra note 54, at 50-56.
62. Carol J.Adams website, http://uww.caroliadams.com(last visited Oct. 28, 2002).
63. See ADAMS, supra note 54, at 50-56.
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demarcate some 'ultimate' differences between us and the other animals,
[and] will reject a vertical hierarchy of humans above animals [and men
above women]." 6' Adams and other ecofeminists argue that one means of
achieving this goal is to adopt a feminist caring ethic in place of the current
notion of animal "rights. "6 5
The concept of the "ethic of care" was developed by Carol Gilligan
as part of the now classic theory of women's different voices.' Gilligan's
different voices theory identifies two perspectives used to solve moral
problems. One perspective is the "ethic of justice," which is based on
hierarchical relationships between rights-holders.67 Traditionally, in
patriarchal culture, men have utilized the ethic of justice. Resolving conflict
under this perspective involves the application of formal rules and
principles.' An alternate perspective Gilligan identifies is the "ethic of
care."' Those who utilize the ethic of care-traditionally women-consider
the details and complexities of emotional relationships between the
individuals experiencing conflict. The value of this perspective is based on
"the ability to care for and protect others."'
In Beyond Animal Rights: A Feminist CaringEthicfor the Treatment of
Animals, Adams and Josephine Donovan utilize Gilligan's theory and
identify the notion of animal "rights" as a construct of a "morality of
rights," or ethic of justice.7' Application of the ethic of justice has not
resulted in success for animals; therefore, the authors argue that we should
move instead to an ethic of care framework to implement adequate
protections for animals.

64. Id. at 12.
65. See, e.g., BEYOND ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 11-12.
66. Women's different voices theory was established in GILLIGAN, supra note 6.

67. See id. at 73.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. Id. Gilligan notes fundamental differences between the two perspectives, such as the
following:
Women's construction of [a]moral problem as a problem of care and
responsibility in relationships rather than as one of rights and rules ties the

development of their moral thinking to changes in their understanding of
responsibility and relationships, just as the conception of morality as justice
ties development to the logic of equality and reciprocity. Thus the logic
underlying an ethic of care is a psychological logic or relationship, which
contrasts with the forma logic of fairness that informs the justice approach.
Id.
71. BEYOND ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 13 (stating that "[w]here the masculine
concern with rights, rules, and an abstract idea of justice tends often to seem like 'a math
problem with humans,' the feminine approach offers a more flexible, situational, and
particularized ethic") (citations omitted).
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B. Conflicts between the Ecofeminist and Animal Rights Movements
1. Sexist Tactics in the Animal Advocacy Movement
Despite the strong connections between feminism and animal
defense theory, not all animal advocates have embraced feminist values.
There is ongoing conflict between FAR and People for the Ethical Treatment
of Animals (PETA), the largest and most visible animal advocacy
organization in the world.' FAR has publicly attacked some of PETA's
sexist advertising campaigns. As one example, a 1995 PETA ad campaign
was designed to encourage organ donation and to discourage xenografts,
or cross-species transplants. The ads featured a Playboy model and a slogan
reading, "Some People Need You Inside Them." ' Perhaps PETA's most
famous ad campaigns have featured nude models and the slogan "I'd
Rather Go Naked Than Wear Fur."7'
Ecofeminists have criticized PETA ad campaigns as objectifying
women and promoting the same hierarchical, patriarchal values that lead
to the exploitation of animals.75 One commentator notes, "PETA is seen as
a 'marketer' that 'sells' animal rights and does so using the very same
oppressive and exploitative images and slogans that are used in the society
at large."76 Ecofeminist groups such as FAR contend, then, that PETA is
propagating the roots of the problem.
2. Theoretical Opposition to the Ecofeminist Vision of Animal Advocacy
Today, the extension of legal rights to animals is still considered by
some to be a ridiculous, if not dangerous, notion. One commentator laments
that "the legal recognition of animal rights is [considered] either.. .a
frivolous and slightly contemptible waste of legal talent and resources,
or.. .a cruel rejection of the superior rights claims of human beings."' Still

72. See About PETA, at http://www.peta.org/about/index.html (People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals website) (last visited Oct. 28, 2002).
73. FRANCIONE, supra note 1, at 75.
74. There are many more examples of PETA actions that are criticized by feminists as
being sexist, including the following: (1) an anti-fur ad in which a nude actress's breasts are
groped (copy of ad on file with author); (2) anti-Premarin protests featuring a nude "Lady
Godiva" riding on horseback through the streets of New York, Washington, and Paris (copy
of ad on file with author); and (3) an ad showing a women in a bikini holding a string of

sausages, with the printed message, "Ithrew a party, but the cattlemen couldn't come (eating
meat causes impotence)." PETA online press release, PETA Billboards Targeting Impotence
in Meat-Eaters Rejected in Five States, available at http://www.petaonline.org/search/news/row.asp?id=32 (June 1, 1999).
75. See, e.g., I FEMINISTS FOR ANIMAL RicHTs NEWSLETTER, Nos. 1-2,4(1996).
76. FRANCIONE, supra note 1, at 75.
77. St. John-Parsons, supra note 43, at 895.
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more controversy is generated when ecofeminism is added to the debate.
Even some fellow animal welfare advocates have harshly criticized the
application of ecofeminist theory to animal rights theory:
[TIhe ecofeminists claim that the rights position is
hyperrational and that it devalues emotion ....
[E]cofeminists
[advance the claim] that rights are somehow inherently
patriarchal or hierarchical. This.. .is simply wrong. We have
seen that to the extent that we are speaking of the right to be
included in the moral community at all, this right is anything
but patriarchal or hierarchal ....
[T]he rights position eliminates the "thingness" of nonhumans and thereby diminishes
the force of the normatively constructed dualism that has
been used to justify the human oppression of nonhumans,
just as the rights view diminishes the force of the male/
female dualism.'
Ecofeminist theory has been criticized by feminists as well as
animal welfare advocates. For example, a common criticism of the different
voices theory is that it is essentialist-that is, it defines certain characteristics as being inherently female or inherently male. Some women are not
naturally caring individuals; some men are. Also, some feminists argue that
attributing caring characteristics to women further feminizes them in
damaging ways.79 While these concerns are important considerations,
perhaps "this nervousness is excessive," as explained by Mona
Harrington: °
Caring is an authentic part of the experience of many women
and is directly relevant to criticisms of power-wielding that
has become detached from human need. In escaping from the
old male conceptions of women's maternal roles, women
should not have to pretend that their own experience of
caregiving means nothing. What women know and value as
caregivers certainly should be on the new agenda of women's
social participation if women want to put it there.81
In the face of opposition-from scholars both for and against
animal welfare-ecofeminist animal defense activists continue to argue for

78. Gary L. Francione, A Review of Beyond Animal Rights: A Feminist Caring Ethicfor the
Treatment of Animals, 18 WOMEN'S RM. L. REP. 95,105 (1996).
79. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to FeministSolidarity: UsingCarol Gilligan
and an Ethic of Care in Law,15 VT. L. REV. 1, 39 (1990) ("Some feminist theories reject Gilligan's
gender-linked analysis of ethical orientations because they fear that it will reinscribe women
with characteristics that are a consequence of, or have been the fodder for, gender
domination.").
80. MONA HARRINGTON, WOMEN LAWYERS: REWRITING THE RULES 254 (1993).

81. Id.
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the extension of legal protections to animals, based on a theory of caring
and morality.
IV. USING ECOFEMINIST THEORY TO ADVANCE
WISE'S THEORY
Wise is correct in his assertion that the American legal system must
recognize personhood status and court standing for animals. This aspect of
his theory should be maintained, even under ecofeminist theory: extending
legal rights to animals would provide needed protections for animals that
cannot be implemented if the law continues to regard animals as
"property." However, Wise's rationality test should be rejected in favor of
the standard of an "ethic of care" advanced by ecofeminists.
A. Replacing "Rights" Concepts with an Ethic of Care
Particularly in recent years, both the ethic of justice and the ethic of
care have been utilized in the American legal system. This section of this
article argues that both approaches are valuable in our legal system, and
every legal problem should be independently analyzed to determine
whether an ethic of care or justice would more appropriately address the
problem. Because of the nature of the legal issues surrounding animal
welfare, ecofeminists would apply an ethic of care, rather than an ethic of
justice, to the body of law pertaining to animals. The ethic of care would
consider the emotional relationships between humans and nonhuman
animals and would assign moral responsibilities based on those relationships.
Gilligan's theory of different voices was not originally designed as
a legal theory. However, her theory applies to the law with ease:
[The] ethic of justice closely parallels the dominant rationality
and methodology of Anglo-American law. This justice ethic
is based on a rights model, where problem-solving consists of
the application of abstract, generalized principles to arbitrate
rights disputes between separate individuals (conflicting
rights-holders) and to privilege one right over another. The
justice-oriented problem-solver seeks a distanced stance from
which to make objective decisions by applying formal rules
of equality and other general principles of justice. Traditionally, this perspective was deemed the highest stage of moral
development, and it has monopolized legal reasoning.8

82. Bender, supra note 79, at 36 (emphasis added).
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Of course, the "legal reasoning" referred to in the above passage is
the traditional, hierarchical reasoning valued by the Roman, English, and
eventually American legal systems. However, as the number of women in
the field of law has increased in recent decades, the ethic of care also has
been applied in our American legal system. In one study of practicing
attorneys in the state of Washington, researchers found "almost
stereotypical distinctions down the line-men focusing on competition and
winning, women favoring cooperation and compromise; men interpreting
issues as conflicts of rights and duties between individuals, women seeing
issues as conflicts of responsibilities in a network of relationships.. .men
authority, women looking to decentralized
trusting hierarchical
"83
consensus.
Gilligan's theory of different voices maintains that "men tend to
solve moral dilemmas by applying rules or principles, and women by
seeking to retain and reinforce relationships among the parties involved.""
While one perspective is not unequivocally superior to the other, one
perspective may work more effectively than the other in different types of
cases. For example, the ethic of care may best be applied in family law
cases, in which the parties will continue to have relationships with one
another after the legal dispute is resolved. Alternatively, the ethic of justice
may best be applied in cases not involving personal relationships and/or
cases in which the parties have directly conflicting interests. A case of
environmental justice may serve as an example--one such case might
involve a dispute between a defendant company operating a large polluting
facility and a plaintiff community group whose members have been
-adversely impacted by the pollution. Here the application of an ethic of
justice would be appropriate. The parties would not have relationships to
maintain and established rules of torts should apply: the party responsible
for inflicting harm should compensate the parties injured.
While an ethic of justice might appropriately address legal issues
like the environmental justice case above, it fails to adequately protect
animals.'5 Recognizing this failure of the "rights" approach, Adams and

83. HARRINGTON, supra note 80, at 190 (discussing research included in RAND JACK &
DANA CROWLEYJACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUESOF
WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS (1989)).
84. HARRINGTON, supra note 80, at 189-90.
85. From the examples given in the text above, it seems that both the ethic of care and the
ethic of justice may play appropriate, if different, roles in our legal system. To determine which
ethic should apply, each individual case and legal problem should be independently
evaluated. Which approach would adequately solve the problem to further the achievement
of justice? Clearly, the ethic of justice and "rights" approach to animal law has failed, as
animals are afforded no legal rights of their own and enjoy few legal protections of any kind.
Thus, as Adams and Donovan argue, the ethic of care should apply to animal law instead.
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Donovan urge activists to go "beyond animal rights" and instead follow an
ethic of care, under which "sympathy, compassion, and caring are the
ground upon which theory about human treatment of animals should be
constructed."' Adams and Donovan identify three main shortcomings of
the rights, or ethic of justice, approach. First, this approach is based on
perceived similarities between animals and humans. In reality, however,
most animals are distinctly different from human beings. Further, we have
limited ways of knowing what animals do or do not experience. We know
that they experience pain, and we know that they experience a range of
emotions that at least seem to be similar to some of the emotions that we
feel. We do not know, however, how similar our perceptions, emotions, and
experiences are to those of nonhuman animals.
Secondly, the rights approach "presumes a society of equal
autonomous agents, who require little support from others."'7 Yet
domesticated animals in particular are dependent upon humans for
survival. A caring ethic recognizes this situation of inequality and
encourages human networks of support for nonhuman animals.
Adams and Donovan's final, and perhaps most important, point is
that the rights theory rejects the importance of emotion. As the authors see
it, "This means that a major basis for the human-animal connectionlove-is not encompassed. Since the exclusion of emotional response is a
major reason why animal abuse and exploitation continue, it seems
contradictory for animal defense advocates to also claim that feelings are
inappropriate guides to ethical treatment."8
Adams and Donovan's analysis applies easily to legal rights
dialogue. In fact, some scholars have applied characteristics of a caring ethic
in a legal context. For example, Thomas G. Kelch argues for the inclusion
of emotion in legal rights for animals and even argues that emotions
already play a role in legal rights discourse. "Looking at rights as grounded
in a single concept or foundational idea is an oversimplification," he
writes." He argues further,
Rights are complex concepts founded on moral, policy,
societal, and cultural ideas. Thus, we should not focus on
finding some single basis for a right, but on discovering the
sundry elements of a right. The more bases we find for a right

86. See BEYOND ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 25 (quotation from the publisher's
prepublication description), cited in FRANCIONE, supra note 1, at 33.
87.

BEYOND ANIMAL RiGHTs, supra note 25, at 15.

88. Id.
89.

Kelch, supra note 14, at 23-24.
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the more firmly convinced we may be that it is a legitimate
and well-founded right.90
Though he does not identify it as such, Kelch's thesis could easily be
classified as an ecofeminist argument:
[A]mong the many things that should have significance in
determining whether an entity, human or non-human, is a
rightholder is one that is almost universally ignored in animal
rights and other rights literature: emotions, and in particular,
compassion. Emotions, being essential aspects of our nature
and of our moral lives, are of relevance in determining who
should be rightholders. If applied to the issue of granting
rights to animals, our sense of compassion should count as a
reason for granting rights to animals.91
Thus, the argument for the inclusion of the feminist feminine
perspective in legal discourse-and in animal rights legal discourse in
particular-is not unprecedented. As they work to go beyond animal
"rights" and implement a caring ethic for the treatment of animals,
ecofeminists have a strong foundation on which to build.
B. Using Ecofeminist Principles to Expand Wise's Theory of Legal Rights
for Animals
In Rattlingthe Cage,Wise provides ample evidence of the advanced
"cognitive capacities" of chimpanzees and bonobos.92 He then argues that
because members of these species can reason and engage in complex
thought processes, they are entitled to the same rights to bodily dignity,
liberty, and integrity as humans with lesser or equal cognitive capacities.93

90. Id.

91. Id.at 1.
92. WIsE, supra note 4, at 230.
93. Id. at 253. Wise points out that some humans with low cognitive ability, such as
infants, comatose patients, and mentally retarded persons, possess some basic legal rights that
should be extended to those primates who have higher cognitive ability:
Some humans-infants, young children, the anencephalic (who suffer from
the congenital absence of major portions of the skull, scalp, and brain, never
attain consciousness, can neither feel nor suffer, and usually die within a few
months of birth), the severely mentally retarded, and those in persistent
vegetative states-either lack autonomy or have autonomies too "low" to be
called "realistic.Judges routinely award them dignity-rights anyway by
using the "all humans are autonomous" legal fiction. But if judges recognize
the liberties of these humans but reject the liberties of apes with greater
autonomy, they act perversely, and their decisions cannot be explained
except as acts of naked prejudice.
Id. at 255.
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Wise is correct in his assertion that nonhuman animals should be granted
basic legal rights. However, Wise's theory would only extend rights to
species whose members possess a level of rationality close to that of
humans. Countless other species-perhaps even all species other than
chimpanzees and bonobos-would be left without adequate protections
under the law.
While a rationality test restricts the types of species entitled to legal
rights, ecofeminism sets no such limitation." Ecofeminism imposes no
particular cut-off point at which humans' moral obligations end, other than
perhaps to comply with Jeremy Bentham's oft-quoted standard: "The
question is not, Can they reason?nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?""
Therefore, ecofeminist principles should serve as the basis for the extension
of legal rights to animals. A legal system based on humans' emotional and
moral relationships with nonhuman animals would grant rights to a
significantly higher number of species than a legal system that would
attempt to measure the cognitive capabilities of each individual species.
Most likely, there will be opposition to the argument that
ecofeminism should provide the underlying basis of legal rights for
animals. Already, Francione, in characteristic criticism of fellow animal
advocates,' has rejected certain applications of ecofeminist theory to animal
advocacy. In his book review of Adams and Donovan's Beyond Animal
Rights: A Feminist Caring Ethic for the Treatment of Animals,97 Francione
criticizes the non-lawyer authors for, in his perception, failing to adequately
consider their theories in the context of legal personhood. 9s Francione states
that the ethic of care "only makes sense when it is applied to situations
involving extant rightholders" and should not form the basis for granting
those rights in the first place." Francione does not reject outright
ecofeminist principles; rather, he argues that the ethic of care could "help"
with application of the law "once we have accepted the personhood of
nonhumans and have included them within the scope of our moral
community."" ° Yet he contends that ecofeminist principles should not be

94. Again, a discussion of which types of legal rights should be extended to animals is
beyond the scope of this article. Rather, this article simply advocates the position that some

legal rights should be granted to nonhuman animals.
95. JEREMY BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
(1789), cited in ORLANS ET AL., supra note 38, at 22-23.
%. For perhaps the most prominent of Francione's extensive criticism of animal advocates
and their work, see FRANCIONE, supra note 1.

97. Francione, supra note 78.
98. Id. at 104.
99. Id. (emphasis omitted).
100. Id.
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applied before that point, as "[ain ethic of care cannot coherently suffice to
require that inclusion....,101
Rather than demonstrating ecofeminists' lack of understanding of
the law, Francione instead reveals his own lack of understanding of the
ways the ethic of care may be applied to legal theory. Under the thesis
advanced in this article, the ethic of care does suffice to require the inclusion
of animals among other rights-holders. In fact, as established above, by
incorporating ecofeminist principles in the legal analysis of who should be
rights-holders and possess courtroom standing, legal scholars, animal
advocates, and lawmakers would be able to provide rights to a larger
number of nonhuman species than they would by incorporating rights
theories of rationality.
V. CONCLUSION
An ecofeminist ethic of caring eliminates many of the restrictions
inherent in Wise's theory in Rattling the Cage. A caring ethic does not
require animals to provide proof of autonomy or rationality in order to
benefit from legal rights, and it does not limit legal rights to chimpanzees
and bonobos only. Further, a caring ethic does not rely on a legal system
that is based on antiquated notions of a hierarchical chain of existence. It
instead embraces compassion, kindness, and ethics as the basis of legal
rights, as illustrated in earlier sections of this article. Importantly, it
recognizes humanity's moral obligations to respect and protect the-bodily
integrity and bodily dignity of nonhuman animals.
Thus, in conclusion, animal advocates and legal reformers should
work to incorporate ecofeminist principles in "rights" jurisprudence. Once
policymakers have recognized the importance of our moral obligations and
emotional relationships with nonhumans, legal rights for animals will
naturally and necessarily follow.

101. Id. (emphasis omitted).

